In this paper we propose a characterization of the coalitional value for transferable utility games (Owen, 1977) , and we define and study coalitional semivalues, which are generalizations of semivalues (Dubey, Neyman and Weber, 1981). 
Introduction
In 1977 Owen defined and axiomatized the coalitional value for games with transferable utility, providing a generalization of the Shapley value to the coalitional framework, and later Hart and Kurz (1983) gave an alternative axiomatization by considering games with an infinite universe of players. On the other hand Dubey, Neyman and Weber (1981) provided a different generalization of the Shapley value by removing Efficiency from the classical axiomatization of Shapley (1953) .
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we propose an alternative axiomatization of the coalitional value by means of three axioms. Two of them, Carrier and Additivity, were already used by Hart and Kurz (1983) . The third one can be seen as a modification of the well known axiom of Anonymity.
Second, as the title of the work already suggests, we marry the two generalizations of the Shapley value proposed by Owen (1977) and Dubey et al. (1981), i.e. we define coalitional semivalues, providing a generalization of semivalues to the coalitional context. We will follow the axiomatic procedure of Dubey et al. (1981) , i.e. we will take Efficiency out of the system proposed in the present paper. In addition we will use the translations to the coalitional framework of some axioms used also by Dubey et al. (1981) , and we will require an additional axiom which is specific to the coalitional context and is satisfied by the coalitional value.
As we will describe in the preliminaries, Owen (1977) defined the coalitional value of a game by applying the Shapley value twice. First, the Shapley value is employed at the level of the coalitions of the coalitional structure, to define a new game on each one of those coalitions. Subsequently, the Shapley value is applied to these new games. This procedure yields precisely the coalitional value of the original game. So, in certain sense we can say that the coalitional value is obtained by means of a "composition" of the Shapley value with itself.
In this work we will show that the coalitional semivalues defined in this paper can also be obtained by means of a "composition" of two arbitrary semivalues.
Furthermore, if one additional axiom is considered in the system proposed here, the resulting coalitional semivalues are "compositions" of a semivalue with itself. Finally, we point out that if we remove Efficiency from the system proposed by Hart and Kurz (1983) we do not obtain all the "compositions" of semivalues, but only those in which a semivalue is "composed" with the Shapley value.
The paper is organized as follows. In Preliminaries we present notation, and previous definitions and results which are needed in the course of the paper.
In Section 3 we provide the new characterization of the coalitional value. In Section 4 we define coalitional semivalues and obtain an explicit formula for them. In Section 5 we prove that coalitional semivalues are "compositions" of semivalues.
Preliminaries
Let U be an infinite set which denotes the universe of players. A coalition is a non-empty subset of U . A transferable utility game (a game for short) is a function v : 2 U → R such that v (∅) = 0, where 2 U denotes the family of all subsets of U . A set N ⊆ U is a carrier of v, if v (S ∩ N ) = v (S) for all S ⊆ U .
By G we denote the space of all games on U with finite carrier and by G N the subspace of G of games with carrier N . It is well known that a basis of G (resp. G N ) is formed by unanimity games u R , where R ⊂ U (resp. R ⊆ N ) is finite, defined by u R (S) = 1 if R ⊆ S, and u R (S) = 0 otherwise.
A game v is monotonic if v (S) ≤ v (T ) when S ⊆ T . A game v ∈ G N is additive if for every i ∈ N there exists a i ∈ R such that v(S) = i∈N a i for every S ⊆ N . By AG and AG N we denote respectively the subspaces of G and G N formed by additive games.
Each finite partition B = {B 1 , . . . , B h } of U is called a coalitional structure.
If N is a coalition, B N denotes the partition of N induced by B, i.e., B N = {B p ∩ N : B p ∩ N = ∅, B p ∈ B}. The set of all pairs (v, B), where v ∈ G, and B is a coalitional structure is denoted by X; and X N denotes the subset of X for which N is a carrier of v. If ψ is a mapping from X into AG, we denote the restriction of ψ to X N by ψ N .
Let π : U → U be a mapping. If v ∈ G, denote by πv the game defined by πv(S) = v (π −1 S). If B is a coalitional structure, denote πB = {πB p : B p ∈ B}. Notice that πB is not necessarily a coalitional structure. Denote B π = πB ∪ {U \πU } if πU = U and B π = πB otherwise. Notice that B π is a coalitional structure if and only if πB q ∩ πB r = ∅ whenever q = r.
In 1977 Owen defined the coalitional value for TU games in the following way.
Let v ∈ G N , and B = {B 1 , . . . , B h } be a coalitional structure, and let B p ∈ B be fixed. For every S ⊆ B p ∩ N , let
and v B(S) the game on B (S) defined by
that is, v B(S) is the game v restricted to the field generated by B (S) (i.e., considering B (S) as set of players.)
Now consider a new game v Owen (1977) characterized this value and gave the following explicit formula.
Proposition 1 (Owen, 1977) . If (v, B) ∈ X N , and i ∈ B p , then
where
Remark 2 The coalitional value φ i (v, B) is independent of the carrier N considered for game v. Actually, Owen (1977) only considered games on a finite set of players when he defined and characterized this value.
Alternatively, Hart and Kurz (1983) characterized the coalitional value by using the following axioms. Let ψ : X → AG.
Carrier : If N is a carrier of v then
.
Anonymity: If π : U → U is one-to-one, then for all i ∈ U it holds that
Theorem 3 (Hart and Kurz, 1983) There is a unique mapping ψ : X → AG satisfying Carrier, Additivity, Anonymity, and Inessential Game, and it is the coalitional value φ.
On the other hand, Dubey et al. (1981) defined the semivalues for TU games as those mappings ψ : G → AG that satisfy the following properties.
(P1) ψ is linear; (P2) If π : U → U is one-to-one, then for each i ∈ U it holds that ψ πi (πv) =
These axioms are commonly referred to as Linearity, Symmetry, Monotoni-city and Projection axioms, see e.g. Aumann and Shapley (1974) , but here we reserve these names for the corresponding axioms in the coalitional context. Dubey et al. (1981) gave an explicit formula for semivalues. Consider a family
and
Denote by φ p the mapping from G into AG defined for each v ∈ G N and every
where s = |S| and n = |N |. One can easily check that φ p is well defined, that is, φ 
satisfying (3), (4) and (5) for every n ∈ N, such that ψ = φ p . Moreover, the correspondence p → φ p is one-to-one.
A characterization of the coalitional value
In this section we are going to characterize the coalitional value by replacing Anonymity and Inessential Game axioms in Theorem 3, by the following one.
Let ψ : X → AG.
This axiom is a stronger version of the Anonymity axiom. Notice that if π were restricted to beeing one-to-one, Rearrangement becomes the Anonymity axiom of Hart and Kurz (1983) . But in Rearrangement we let π be any mapping. In this way, this new axiom can also be seen as a kind of consistency property.
Indeed, what π does, apart from renaming players in U , is to maintain the size of B p and to reduce (or maintain) the size of other coalitions in B, as if some of the players belonging to other members of the coalitional structure had decided to act really as a single player. Thus Rearrangement requires that the value of a player in B p should not be affected after renaming players in U and/or reducing (or maintaining) the sizes of the other coalitions in B.
Theorem 5 There is a unique mapping ψ : X → AG that satisfies Carrier, Additivity and Rearrangement, and it is the coalitional value φ.
PROOF. First let us see that φ verifies the above axioms. By Theorem 3, it only remains to prove that φ satisfies Rearrangement. So let (v, B) ∈ X N , and π : U → U such that πB q ∩ πB r = ∅ if q = r, and π : B p → πB p is one-to-one. By Proposition 1 if i ∈ B p it holds that
where A T = πBq∈T (πB q ∩ πN ). Since π : B p → πB p is one-to-one, the second term in this equality is equal to
where C T = Bq∈T B q ∩ N . But this summation is precisely φ i (v, B).
Next we prove that these three axioms fully determine φ.
By Additivity it is sufficient to consider the games c · u R , where c ∈ R and R ⊂ U is finite. Let B = {B 1 , . . . , B h } be a coalitional structure of U .
Let i / ∈ R. Since R ∪ {i} and R are carriers of c · u R , by Carrier (i)
Now assume that B R = {B 1 , . . . , B }, and without loss of generality that
To complete the proof it is enough to show that for each
Denote B +1 = U \R. Thus, the set B = B p : p = 1, . . . , + 1 is a coalitional structure of U .
Since B R = B R , Carrier (ii) implies
Let us consider a mapping π 1 : U → U , such that π 1 B q ∩π 1 B r = ∅ if q = r, and such that π 1 i = i for every i ∈ B 1 , and π 1 B p = |B 1 |, for every p = 1, . . . , .
Applying Rearrangement
Now notice that π 1 R is a carrier of π 1 (c · u R ), and from Carrier (i) it follows
Notice also that players in π 1 R are all identical (since all the π 1 B p are of the same size, for all 1 ≤ p ≤ ).
Applying Carrier (i) and Rearrangement again (actually, its weaker version of Anonymity) it holds that
From (7), (8) and (9), we conclude that for every i ∈ B 1 it holds that
Next consider k ≤ , and, by induction, assume that
Since all the π k B p are of the same size, for p = k . . . , , it follows that all the players in π k (B k ∪ . . . ∪ B ) are identical. Applying the induction hypothesis, Carrier (i) and Rearrangement (again its weaker version of Anonymity) it holds that
Finally by (7), (11), and (12), for all i ∈ B k it holds that
And the proof is complete. 2
Remark 6
In the characterization of Hart and Kurz (1983) an infinite population is needed. However as the reader can easily check, we do not need an infinite population to state Theorem 5, that is, U can be a finite set.
Coalitional semivalues
As we mentioned in Preliminaries, Dubey et al. (1981) A mapping ψ : X → AG will be called a coalitional semivalue if it satisfies:
Rearrangement;
is also monotonic;
and |πB p | = 1. Then
To interpret this axiom we will assume that B p ⊆ N , otherwise v is the zero game. Since coalition B p is formed by veto players in game v, all its subcoalitions are powerless. In this sense B p acts as a single player, so we can say that B p behaves in v as in u Bp , since players in U \B p are also null players in both games. And this is at the root of the Coalitional Partnership axiom.
What π does in this axiom is to focus attention on B p by formally turning this coalition into one individual. Thus we obtain the semivalue of the "single player" B p in πv, and then consider the unanimity game ψ πBp (πv, πB) · u Bp .
This axiom requires the semivalue of any player i ∈ B p in this unanimity game to coincide with this semivalue in the former game v.
Notice also that a coalition formed by veto players is a coalition of partners (Kalai and Samet, 1987) and that the Coalitional Partnership axiom has a parallelism with the Partnership axiom used by these authors to characterize the weighted Shapley values.
In what follows we provide an explicit formula for coalitional semivalues.
Let (a n ) n∈N and (b n ) n∈N be two collections of vectors, with a n , b n ∈ R n , satisfying (3), (4) and (5) for every n ∈ N. Define φ a,b : X → AG for every finite coalition N , every (v, B) ∈ X N , and every i ∈ B p by
where A T = Bq∈T B q ∩ N , and t = |T | and s = |S|.
Theorem 7 A mapping ψ : X → AG is a coalitional semivalue if and only if there exist two collections of vectors (a n ) n∈N and (b n ) n∈N , with a n , b n ∈ R n , satisfying (3), (4) and (5) for every n ∈ N, such that ψ = φ a,b .
PROOF. This theorem is a consequence of propositions 8 and 11. 2
Proposition 8 Let (a n ) n∈N and (b n ) n∈N be two families of vectors satisfying (3), (4) and (5) for every n ∈ N. Then mapping φ a,b is a coalitional semivalue on X.
PROOF. First let us see that φ a,b is well defined, that is for every (v, B) ∈
. Clearly, it suffices to prove
(v, B) for every i ∈ N . So let i ∈ B p ∩ N and let us distinguish three cases.
Hence by (13) the latter sum is
Since k is a null player in v it follows that
Since a n satisfies (5), this is equal to φ
where A T = Bq∈T B q ∩ N , t = |T | and s = |S|. Since k is a null player in v, and b n satisfies condition (5), it follows that the sum above is equal to
Let us now see that φ a,b is a coalitional semivalue. It is clear that φ a,b satisfies Carrier (ii) and Linearity. Monotonicity and the Projection axioms follow respectively since a n and b n satisfy (3), (4) for every n ∈ N. Checking Rearrangement is as in Theorem 5. So it only remains to prove that φ a,b satisfies Coalitional Partnership.
Let (v, B) ∈ X N such that B p is formed by veto players in v. Also let π :
contained in N , then v = 0 and the result follows immediately. So suppose
where A T = Bq∈T B q ∩ N , t = |T | and s = |S|. Also by (13),
where C T = πBq∈T πB q ∩ πN , and the last equality follows since b n satisfies condition (3), and consequently
Finally, if α is any real number, by (13),
where the last equality holds since a n satisfies (3).
Hence, from (14), (15) and (16) it follows that
The next two lemmas will be used in the proof of the following proposition.
Their proofs are located in the appendix. First some definitions. 
Let ρ N = ρ N, t, s : t + s ≤ |N | + 1 be the collection of such matrices, and let
where A T = Bq∈T B q ∩ N , and t = |T | and s = |S|. Proposition 11 If ψ is a coalitional semivalue on X, then there exist two collections (a n ) n∈N , (b n ) n∈N , with a n , b n ∈ R n , satisfying (3), (4) and (5) for every n ∈ N, such that ψ = φ a,b .
PROOF. Let ψ be a coalitional semivalue on X. By Lemma 9, for each finite coalition N ⊂ U there exists a collection of matrices ρ N, t, s satisfying (17) and (18), and such that ψ
Clearly, Anonymity (Rearrangement) implies ρ N, t, s = ρ N , t, s for every pair of finite coalitions N, N ⊂ U such that |N | = |N | = n. So let us denote ρ n, t, s = ρ N, t, s and let us prove that there exist two collections (a n ) n∈N and (b n ) n∈N , satisfying (3), (4) and (5) for every n ∈ N, and such that ρ For each n ∈ N, define a Now let us see that a n and b n satisfy conditions (3), (4) and (5).
Since ρ n,n,1 and ρ n,1,n satisfy (17) and (18), it immediately follows that a n and b n both satisfy conditions (3) and (4). Now let us see that a n satisfies (5). Let N ⊂ U be a finite coalition, and v ∈ G N . Let k / ∈ N and consider a coalitional structure B such that k / ∈ B p and k / ∈ Bq∩N ∈B N B q . Then for every i ∈ B p it holds
where A T = Bq∈T B q ∩ N , t = |T | and s = |S|. And by Carrier (ii)
Taking B such that |B N | = n − 1 and |B p ∩ N | = 1, this amounts to a n+1 t + a n+1 t+1 = a n t for every 0 ≤ t ≤ n, and consequently a n satisfies (5).
Next let us see that b n satisfies (5). Again let N ⊂ U be a finite coalition, and v ∈ G N . Let k / ∈ N and consider now a coalitional structure B such that
Consequently if 0 ≤ t ≤ |B N | − 1 and every 0 ≤ s ≤ |B p ∩ N | − 1 then
Let t + s ≤ n + 1, and take B such that |B N | = t and |B p ∩ N | = s, then the equality above amounts to
Choosing t = 1 and s = n, these equalities imply that b n satisfies condition (5).
To complete the proof it is enough to show that if t + s ≤ n + 1 then
We will proceed by induction on s.
In the case s = 1, Lemma 10 and the definition of a n imply that if t ≤ n it holds that ρ n, t,1
So let us assume that the statement is true if s < s and let us prove it for s.
To prove that ρ n, t, s t,s = a t t · b s s for each s = 1, . . . , s − 1 we will proceed by reverse induction on s. We will first show that ρ n, t, s t, s−1
Let us consider a finite coalition N ⊂ U , such that |N | = n, and let B be any coalitional structure such that |B N | = t, and |B p ∩ N | = s, and B p ⊆ N . Let v ∈ G N be any game for which B p is formed by veto players. If i ∈ B p , by Lemma 9 it holds that
Let π : U → U be a mapping as in the statement of the Coalitional Partnership axiom; that is, such that πB q ∩ πB r = ∅, if q = r and |πB p | = 1. Also let θ :
U → U such that θ π (B q ∩ N ) = 1 for all B q ∈ B and θ (πB q )∩θ (πB r ) = ∅ if q = r. Applying Rearrangement we have
Furthermore, since B p is a carrier of u Bp , by (19) for all α ∈ R it holds that
, by the Coalitional Partnership axiom, and taking into account (21), (22) and (23), we can conclude that for any v ∈ G N for which B p is formed by veto players, it holds that
Therefore, if t + s ≤ n + 1 and 0 ≤ t ≤ t − 1, it holds that ρ n+1, t, s t, s−1
. Now assume that if t + s ≤ n + 1 and 0 ≤ t ≤ t − 1 it holds that ρ n, t, s
and let us see that ρ 
and the proof is complete. 2
Example 12
In this example we will show that Coalitional Partnership is independent from the rest of the axioms used in Theorem 7. Indeed, for each n ∈ N and t ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1} define
if n > 1 and (t = 0 or t = n − 1) 0 otherwise, . Let us consider the mapping ξ : X → AG defined for each
One can easily check that ξ is well defined and satisfies the Carrier (ii), Lin- (3) and (4), the mapping ψ
is a semivalue on G N . Moreover, every semivalue on G N is of this form, and the mapping p n → ψ p n is one-to-one.
By examining the proof of Theorem 14 above one can realize that it is not necessary to consider that N is included in the infinite set U .
For coalitional semivalues we have a similar result. Let a = (a n ) m n=1 and b = (b n ) m n=1 be two collections of vectors, with a n , b n ∈ R n , satisfying (3), (4) for every n = 1, . . . , m, and (5) for every n = 1, . . . , m − 1 (Notice that by (5) we only need to specify a m and b m to completely determine a and b.) Define the mapping ψ a,b :
where A T = Bq∈T B q , and t = |T | and s = |S|.
The proof of the following theorem is very similar to that of Theorem 7.
Theorem 15 For each pair of collections of vectors a and b as before, mapping ψ a,b : X M → AG M is a coalitional semivalue on M . Moreover, every coalitional semivalue on M has this form.
Coalitional semivalues as "compositions" of semivalues
As mentioned in Preliminaries, the coalitional value of a game is obtained by applying the Shapley value twice as follows. First we define a new game by means of the Shapley value, and later we apply the Shapley value to the new game. In this sense we say that the coalitional value is a "composition" of the Shapley value with itself. This section is devoted to proving that coalitional semivalues can be obtained in a similar way. That is, every coalitional semivalue is the "composition" of two semivalues. And on the other hand, the "composition" of two semivalues will yield a coalitional semivalue.
Let ψ : G → AG be a semivalue, N a finite coalition and v ∈ G N . Let B be a coalitional structure and let us fix
where B (S) and v B(S) are defined in (1) and (2) respectively. That is, v
is the semivalue of "player" S in game v B(S) .
Proposition 16 Let (a n ) and (b n ) be two families of vectors satisfying (3), (4) and (5) for every n ∈ N. Let ψ 1 and ψ 2 be respectively the semivalues defined by these collections according to Theorem 4. Then for every (v, B) ∈ X N and
PROOF. Applying (6) twice we obtain
,
The next Corollary states that a coalitional semivalue is the "composition" of two semivalues.
Corollary 17 A mapping ψ : X → AG is a coalitional semivalue if and only if there exist two semivalues ψ 1 , ψ 2 : G → AG such that for every finite coalition N ,and every (v, B) ∈ X N it holds that
PROOF. This is a direct consequence of Theorem 7 and Proposition 16. 2
Remark 18 As in Remark 13 this corollary can be adapted easily to the case in which the carrier is a fixed finite set.
Let M be a finite coalition and m = |M |. 
for all i ∈ B p .
Now for every finite coalition
that is, in B S (N ) we have partitioned N into singletons, and in B T (N ) all the members in N are "together" in one coalition.
In the next theorem we identify the semivalues ψ 1 , ψ 2 of Corollary 17.
Theorem 20 If ψ is a coalitional semivalue, then the mappings
are semivalues and for every (v, B) ∈ X N it holds that
PROOF. Let ψ be a coalitional semivalue and (a n ) and (b n ) be the two families of vectors associated with ψ according to Theorem 7. From Proposition 16 it suffices to show that ψ s and ψ t are the semivalues associated respectively with (a n ) and (
So ψ s is the semivalue associated with (a n ). And similarly for ψ t and (b n ). 2
Remark 21
In the theorem above we have seen that the mapping ψ s (respectively ψ t ) that assigns its coalitional semivalue to every game v ∈ G when all the players in the carrier of v are separated (respectively together), is a semivalue; it is in this sense that coalitional semivalues can be considered as generalizations of semivalues.
According to Corollary 17 coalitional semivalues are "compositions" of two semivalues, but these two semivalues do not necessarily coincide. Next we characterize the subfamily of coalitional semivalues that are the "composition" of a semivalue with itself. We need the following axiom, where ψ : X → AG.
This axiom requires ψ to yield the same results when all the players in the carrier of v act together as when each of them acts on his own.
Theorem 22 A mapping ψ : X → AG satisfies Carrier (ii), Linearity, Rearrangement, Monotonicity, Projection, Coalitional Partnership, and Coalitional
Structure Equivalence if and only if there exists a semivalue ξ on G such that
PROOF. This is an immediate consequence of Theorem 7 and Theorem 20. 2
Remark 23
Notice that the mapping defined in Example 12 satisfies Coalitional Structure Equivalence. Therefore, Coalitional Partnership is independent from the other axioms in the previous theorem.
To finish this section we will consider the characterization of Hart and Kurz (1983) given in Theorem 3. It turns out that if we remove Efficiency from the system proposed by these authors, we do not obtain all the "compositions" of semivalues, but only those in which a semivalue is "composed" with the Shapley value.
Theorem 24 A mapping ψ : X → AG satisfies the Carrier (ii), Linearity, Anonymity, Inessential Game, Monotonicity, and Projection axioms if and only if there exists a semivalue ξ on G such that for every (v, B) ∈ X N ,
PROOF. First of all it is clear that if ξ is a semivalue, the mapping defined by (25) satisfies these axioms.
To prove the converse consider a mapping ψ : X → AG, that satisfies these axioms. Let ψ s : G → AG be the mapping defined by
Clearly, by Carrier (ii) and (27) the mapping ψ s is well defined. And since ψ satisfies the Linearity, Anonymity, Monotonicity and Projection axioms, it immediately follows that ψ s satisfies (P1), (P2), (P3) and (P4). By Theorem 4 the mapping ψ s is a semivalue on G.
Now let B = {B 1 , . . . , B h } be an arbitrary coalitional structure and consider the set H = {i 1 , . . . , i h }, where i p ∈ B p for each p = 1, . . . , h. Consider also the family of games v B : v ∈ G , where v B is the game v restricted to the field generated by B (i.e., considering B as set of players). Obviously we can
Mapping ψ B is well defined, since v B = w B implies (v − w) B = 0 and, applying Linearity and Inessential Game, for every B p ∈ B it holds that
On the other hand notice that for every
Hence
Now let us show equality (25) for ξ = ψ s , and the proof will be completed.
Taking into account that for every v, w ∈ G it holds that v
, and from Linearity, we only need to consider unanimity games.
So let u R be a unanimity game, with R ⊂ U finite. First we show that
So let i / ∈ N . By Monotonicity ψ i (u R , B) ≥ 0. Now consider the game
Since w is monotonic it follows that ψ i (w, B) ≥ 0.
By the Projection and Linearity axioms ψ i (w, B) = ψ i −u R + j∈R u {j} , B = −ψ i (u R , B), and therefore, ψ i (w, B) ≤ 0. Consequently it holds that ψ i (w, B) =
where the first equality follows from (27) and since u R ∈ G R ; the second by definition of ψ Since the Shapley value is symmetric and ψ satisfies Anonymity we obtain the desired result.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 9:
PROOF. Let B be a coalitional structure. First notice that if ψ satisfies the Linearity, Monotonicity and Projection axioms, then for every unanimity game u R , where R ⊆ N , it holds that
The proof of this statement is identical to the proof of (27), so we omit it. Now let B p ∈ B such that B p ∩N = ∅. Consider the vector space formed by the linear mappings from G N into AG Bp∩N . Notice that for every mapping ψ on X that satisfies Linearity, the composition of the mapping ψ N (·, B) and the projection P r : AG N → AG Bp∩N defined by P r(w) = w |Bp∩N , belongs to the latter vector space. This composition will be denoted by ψ N (·, B) |Bp∩N . Furthermore, the mappings ψ N (·, B) |Bp∩N , where ψ satisfies the Carrier (ii), Linearity, Rearrangement, Monotonicity and Projection axioms, generate a subspace, which will be denoted by
Since unanimity games {u R : R ⊆ N } form a basis of G N , every element
Bp is fully determined by its values on these games. In fact, due to (28) and by Anonymity (Rearrangement actually) it is enough to specify f i (u R ) for a single player i ∈ B p ∩ R and for every unanimity game u R , with R ⊆ N .
Let us see now that if u R 1 , u R 2 are two unanimity games with
Assume that f = 
And for each i = 1, 2 let π : U → U such that π B q ∩ π B r = ∅ if q = r, and
Then we have for every i ∈ B p ∩ R 1 and every j ∈ B p ∩ R 2
where the 2nd and 6th equalities follow from Carrier (ii); the 3rd and 5th from Rearrangement and the 4th from the fact that π 1 u R 1 = π 2 u R 2 . Consequently we have proved (29).
So to specify f i (u R ) for a player i ∈ B p ∩ R, it is enough to know how many players are there in B p ∩R and how many coalitions in B intersect coalition R. 
If i ∈ B p \N , then i / ∈ R for all u R such that R ⊆ N , and therefore (28) Assume that min |C r ∩ N | : r = q ≥ min |B r ∩ N :| r = p = K, and consider a mapping θ 1 : U → U such that θ 1 (C r ∩ N ) ∩ θ 1 (C r ∩ N ) = ∅, whenever r = r , and
(1) θ 1 N ⊆ N , (2) θ 1 h = h, for all h ∈ C q ∩ N , (3) θ 1 (C r ∩ N ) = K, for all r ∈ {1, . . . , } \{q}.
Consider also the game v PROOF. Clearly, it suffices to prove that if k ∈ U \N , then ρ N, t, s = ρ N ∪{k}, t, s , for t, s such that t + s ≤ |N | + 1. 
where A T = Bq∈T B q ∩ N , and t = |T |, and s = |S|.
On the other hand, since k is a null player in v it holds that 
where A T = Bq∈T B q ∩ N . Hart, S. and Kurz M. (1983) . "Endogeneous Formation of Coalitions". Econo-
